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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 930176-CA

GARY D. HILFIKER,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for murder and aggravated
arson, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-5-203

(Supp. 1992) and 76-6-103

(1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the police have probable cause to arrest defendant at
the time they gave him a Miranda warning and questioned him about
events occurring on April 24, 1992?
"The determination of whether probable cause exists 'depends
upon an examination of all the information available to the
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at
the time the [arrest] was made.'" State v. Chapman. 841 P.2d 725,
728 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088
(Utah 1986)).

The trial court's findings as to the facts and

circumstances relating to probable cause will not be overturned on

appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in
error."

State v. Rocha. 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979).

Accord

State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d at 728,
2.

Did the trial court properly conclude that defendant

waived his right to counsel, previously invoked under Miranda, and
that defendant's confession, therefore, was admissible and that his
motion to suppress should be denied?
An appellate court "will reverse the trial court's finding of
a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] only if that finding is clearly
in error or the court has abused its discretion."

State v.

Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Section 77-7-2 of Utah Code Annotated, governing arrest by
police officers, provides in pertinent part:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
•

• •

(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that
the person arrested has committed it[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(2) (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of
murder and aggravated arson, both first degree felonies (R. 6-8) .
Defendant filed two motions to suppress, one for "statements and
all evidence secured through unlawful arrest" and the other for
"defendant's statement to police" (R. 43-46). The trial court held
an evidentiary hearing on the motions and thereafter denied both of
them (R. 280-87 or addendum a ) .
2

Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted as charged.
court

then

entered

judgment

and

sentenced

defendant

The

to two

consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison
(R. 146-47).
Defendant subsequently filed this timely appeal, which the
Utah Supreme Court poured over to this Court (R. 152 or addendum
b).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following chronology focuses on facts relevant to the
resolution of this appeal.

The times indicated reflect the

witnesses' best estimations of when particular events occurred on
April 24, 1992.
3:30 am

Fire fighters respond to a call of a house fire at
434 Bryan Avenue in Salt Lake City and find the
home "pretty much fully involved in the fire" (R.
498-99) .

4:00 am

Jody Whitaker, a Salt Lake City police officer,
arrives on the scene (R. 168).
A neighbor
immediately directs him to defendant, who is "quite
excited and screaming something about some -- the
possibility of somebody being inside of the house"
(R. 169) . Another officer is trying to prevent
defendant from entering the home. Whitaker sees a
cut on defendant's right hand that is "bleeding
pretty badly" and so takes him to an awaiting
ambulance (R. 169).

4:55 am

Following the ambulance that is transporting
defendant, Whitaker arrives at Holy Cross Hospital
(R. 177). Whitaker goes to the hospital "[b]ecause
of the fact that [defendant] was so excited, I
didn't want him to -- in case there was somebody
inside the house, I didn't -- basically just to let
him know that everybody will be okay. I was there
for moral support" (R. 171). At the hospital,
Whitaker asks defendant what happened, and
defendant says he broke a window by slapping it
with his open hand (R. 172) . Jeff Long, a fire
investigator for Salt Lake City, also goes to the
3

hospital and is told by defendant that he does not
know how the fire started (R. 775, 778).
5:00 am

Robin Howell, a Salt Lake City police officer and
the detective in charge of this case, responds to a
call of a fire fatality at the Bryan Avenue home
(R. 189-90, 190-91) . For just over an hour, he
tours the site, gathering information from other
police and fire officers. He discovers or is shown
two similar jackets with blood on them, blood on
three vehicles and on the house, a kitchen knife
with blood on it, the body of a woman in the front
room of the home, and a burn pattern near the
victim that may be caused by a fire accelerant. He
also learns that defendant lived in the home and
discovered the fire, and that defendant had been
taken to the hospital for treatment of a cut on his
hand (R. 190-94) .

5:58 am

As he is driving defendant back home to Bryan
Avenue from the hospital, Jody Whitaker receives a
radio request from Robin Howell to transport
defendant to the public safety building (R. 173,
195) . Both Whitaker and Howell testify that this
is "standard action" when investigating witnesses
to a crime (R. 173-74, 196). Defendant becomes
"quite excited" at the request, indicating to
Whitaker "that he was positive that they found her
inside dead, and they'd think he did it" (R. 174).
Defendant says he is tired, wants to go home and
sleep, but agrees to talk to somebody at public
safety (R. 174-75).

6:10 am

Whitaker and defendant arrive at the public safety
building and go to the sixth floor, where they meet
Robin Howell.
Whitaker sits in an office with
defendant and begins writing up his report, while
Howell does "some running around" (R. 175, 183).
Whitaker stays with defendant until his shift is
over, just after 8 am (R. 177).

6:30 am

Howell asks Whitaker and defendant to move to an
interview room (R. 184).
In a ten-minute
conversation, Howell obtains written permission
from defendant, who had been living at the Bryan
Avenue home, to search the premises (R. 196) .
Howell then leaves the room to radio the officers
at the scene to proceed with a search (R. 197).

6:50 am

Based on what he has seen and heard at Bryan
Avenue, Howell is suspicious both that the death of
Marsha Haverty may be a homicide and that defendant
4

may be involved (R. 198-200). Howell, therefore,
enumerates defendant's Miranda rights to him prior
to interviewing him (R. 197-98, 205, 214-15).*
Howell then questions defendant, who makes no
inculpatory statements, but who also fails to
dispel Howell's suspicions about defendant's lack
of alibi from 1:30-3:30 am and the absence of any
singeing of defendant's hair, which Howell believes
would have occurred if defendant had entered the
burning home as he contended (R. 220-21).
7:15 am

Howell turns the interview over to James Alcock,
another police detective, so that he can return to
Bryan Avenue, where he is in charge of the
investigation. Howell fills Alcock in on what he
knows and gives him further direction for the
interview (R. 223-24).

7:43 am

Alcock begins interviewing defendant in order to
clarify "some discrepancies in the statement,
vagueness of times, places, names, such things as
that" (R. 253).

9:00 am

When Alcock turns the tape over in his recorder, he
reaffirms defendant's Miranda rights. Defendant
agrees to continue talking to him (R. 236-37, 25859).
Pursuant to Howell's directions, Alcock discusses
with defendant arrangements for taking his bloodstained
clothing
and
obtaining
replacement
clothing,
perhaps
from
the
evidence
room.
Defendant agrees to the exchange (R. 238).

9:14 am

Alcock requests permission from defendant for a
blood draw and advises defendant that he need not
agree to the request. At this point, defendant
asks for an attorney, and the interview is
terminated (R. 306). Alcock leaves the room to
telephone Howell about defendant's request for
counsel. David Timmerman, another detective who
had entered the room a few minutes earlier,
clarifies to defendant that his request for an
attorney has triggered the termination of the
interview (R. 238-40, 265-67).

9:15 am

Because defendant states that he is hungry, Alcock
takes him to the first floor cafeteria, where

1

The State conceded at the suppression hearing that, at this
point, defendant was in custody (R. 316-17).
5

defendant purchases breakfast and some aspirin.
During the 45-60 minutes defendant and Alcock are
in the cafeteria, they talk about mutual
acquaintances in the taxi cab industry (R. 240-42,
275) .
9:33 am

Having been informed of defendant's request for
counsel, Robin Howell stops the consent search of
the Bryan Avenue home and returns to the public
safety building to prepare a probable cause
statement for a search warrant (R. 227).

10:00 am

Alcock and defendant return from the cafeteria to a
sixth floor interview room, where Alcock leaves
defendant for a few minutes. During this time, the
evidence room notifies Alcock that clothing long
enough to fit defendant has been found. Alcock
returns to the interview room, intending to tell
defendant about the clothing.2
At this point,
defendant says either, flI want to tell you what
really happened last night. I can't live with this
anymore" or "I need to talk to you11 (R. 242-44,
723) .3

2

Appellant's brief intimates some conflict in Detective
Alcock's testimony on this point (Br. of App. at 7, 12). At the
suppression hearing, Alcock testified, "I do not recall saying
anything; however, I may have said, 'Hey, Gary,' in order to just
basically get his attention" (R. 244). At trial, Alcock testified,
"I opened the door to the interview room and stepped in to say,
'Gary, you know, we've located some clothing. I am going to go
down and get it. I will be right back'" (R. 723). If Alcock's
phrase at trial, "stepped in to say" is interpreted as "stepped in
with the intention of saying," then no significant conflict exists
between the detective's statements at the suppression hearing and
at trial. Under either interpretation, Alcock did not initiate any
conversation that could reasonably be regarded as interrogation of
defendant.
3

Once again, appellant's brief seems to imply that Alcock's
testimony is in conflict (Br. of App at 12-13) . A close reading of
both statements in context, however, reveals no significant
inconsistency. Alcock reported defendant's longer, more detailed
statement at the suppression hearing, where he specifically
reported, in response to counsel's individual questions, what each
party said when Alcock reentered the interview room. (R. 244) . The
more general statement, which appellant refers to as "less
forceful," came in at trial, where Alcock made a longer narrative
response to a more general question about how the conversation
began (R. 722-23) . Both statements are consistent in indicating
that defendant initiated the substantive conversation, the matter
6

10:15 am

After leaving the room to get a tape recorder and
tapes, and telling Howell that defendant wants to
make a statement, Alcock returns to the interview
room (R. 244-45), He reaffirms defendant's Miranda
rights, specifically reminding him of his right to
an attorney (R. 248-49). Defendant then admits to
stabbing Marsha Haverty and setting the house on
fire to cover up what he had done (See State's
exhibit #37 for complete transcript).

11:16 am

The interview stops.
Jeff Long, the fire
department arson investigator, enters and asks to
talk with defendant (R. 276).

11:20 am

Jeff Long resumes the interview (R. 276-77).

11:23 am

The interview ends (R. 276).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

When

the police

conducted

the

custodial

questioning

of

defendant, they had probable cause to arrest him and had properly
given him a Miranda warning.

Robin Howell, the detective in

charge, had gleaned a variety of facts from police and fire
officers at the scene.

Based on this constellation of facts, he

reasonably believed that a crime had been committed and that
defendant committed it.

The trial court so found, and defendant

has wholly failed to demonstrate how the undisputed facts led to a
clearly erroneous ruling.

Because the fourth amendment was not

violated, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress.
After defendant had invoked his right to counsel pursuant to
Miranda, all interrogation by the police immediately ceased.

An

hour later, defendant initiated a conversation with the police that
ultimately led to his confession.
of legal relevance here.

7

Prior to implicating himself,

defendant repeatedly acknowledged that he understood his rights
under Miranda. His subsequent course of action, giving the police
a detailed and incriminating account of murder and arson, in
conjunction

with

his

testimony

at

the

suppression

hearing,

demonstrates that he waived his right to counsel knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in so deciding.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHEN THE POLICE CONDUCTED THE CUSTODIAL
QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, THEY HAD PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST HIM, AND THEY HAD PROPERLY
GIVEN HIM A MIRANDA WARNING. THEREFORE, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT WAS NOT VIOLATED AND THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS.
Defendant argues that, because the police officers detained
and questioned him without probable cause for an arrest, and
because defendant made incriminating statements without the benefit
of any intervening event to attenuate his confession from the
allegedly illegal arrest, all statements following the initial
detention must be suppressed (Br. of App. at 8).

The attenuation

prong of defendant's argument need not be addressed unless the
trial court clearly erred in its determination that the police had
probable cause to arrest defendant.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a police officer
must have probable cause to detain an individual for custodial
questioning.

Dunawav v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 216

(1979) .

Plainly, to hold an individual and question him without such

8

probable cause will violate the fourth amendment

prohibition

against unreasonable seizures.
The "ultimate inquiry" for determining whether an individual
is "in custody" for fourth amendment purposes is "simply whether
there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of
the degree associated with a formal arrest."

California v.

Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275
(1983) (per curiam).

This is an objective test, one measured by

"how a reasonable man

in the suspect's position would have

understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442,
104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).
Defendant argues at length that he was in custody beginning at
about 6:00 am -- "from the moment he left the hospital enroute
[sic] to the police station, if not sooner" (Br. of App. at 22).
Notably,

the State

conceded

at the suppression hearing that

defendant was in custody at 6:50 am, when Detective Howell gave
defendant his Miranda warning (R. 316). The prosecution stated, "I
don't think we can get around that.

Although Detective Howell

wasn't sure that he would let him go, the -- we are acquiescing in
custody and detention occurring at that point"

(R. 316-317).

Furthermore, the trial court, in ruling on the suppression motion,
stated:
Defendant was given the Miranda warning as the
interview started in the Homicide Section
about 6:50 am.
Officer Howell advised
Defendant he didn't want to let him go until
he got more information. He advised Defendant
he was detaining him.
(R. 283).

It is unclear to what end defendant's lengthy custody argument
on appeal is directed.

Defendant gains nothing by asserting that

he was in custody at 6:00 am rather than 6:50 am. In that interim,
defendant only gave his consent to search the premises at Bryan
Avenue.

He made no inculpatory statements.

The pivotal question thus becomes whether, at 6:50 am when
Detective Howell formally recognized the detention by enumerating
defendant's Miranda rights to him, the officer had probable cause
to believe that a crime had been committed and that defendant had
committed it.
The determination of whether probable cause exists depends
upon an examination of all the circumstances confronting the
officer at the time.

See State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088

(Utah 1986) ; see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176,
69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949). It is an objective determination, made
from the standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, cautious police
officer . . . guided by his experience and training."

United

States v. Davis, 458 P.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir. 1972) . Probable cause
does not rely on certainties.

Instead, as the name implies, it

calls for "a rationally based conclusion of probability." State v.
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. And, police officers can make an arrest
based on probable cause without a warrant if "from the facts known
to the officer, and the inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense."
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah App. (1991) (quoting

10

State v. Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972)).

See also Utah Code

Ann. § 77-7-2(2) (1990) (governing arrest by police officers).
In this case, when Detective Howell mirandized defendant at
6:50 am, he had the following facts before him.

He knew that

defendant had lived in the Bryan Avenue home, that there were no
signs of forced entry into the home, that a woman had died in the
fire, that defendant discovered the fire, and that the burn pattern
near the victim's body

suggested use of a fire accelerant.

Detective Howell saw that defendant's clothes were blood-stained,
and he also knew that blood had been found near the home on two
similar jackets, at least one of which belonged to defendant; on
three vehicles, one of which was rented by defendant; on a knife;
and on the home itself. He also knew that defendant had been taken
to the hospital for treatment of a cut on his hand (R. 191-94, 68687, 704-05, 707).
Based upon this constellation of facts, all known to Detective
Robin Howell at the time he gave defendant his Miranda rights, the
trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause to seize
defendant

(R. 281-82, 287).

Defendant does not dispute these

facts, but instead focuses his analysis on Jody Whitaker, the
patrol officer who first arrived on the scene and who later
accompanied defendant to the hospital (Br. of App. at 25) . Officer
Whitaker

was

a

patrol

officer

who

happened

to

be

neighborhood and who filled in where he was needed.

in

the

He helped

defendant obtain needed medical attention, accompanied him to the
hospital, and offered to drive him home afterwards.

11

His role was

essentially one of moral support (R. 168-71).

Because he was not

the investigator assigned to oversee the case, he was not privy to
much of the information Robin Howell had and was not in any
position to make the probable cause decision.

To focus on Jody

Whitaker in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest
defendant is to miss the mark entirely. The focus should properly
be on Robin Howell, the officer in charge, who had the facts before
him and who actually made the probable cause determination.
As to Howell, defendant states only, "The lack of probable
cause to arrest Gary is emphasized by Detective Howell's decision
not to mirandize Gary during the initial interview at the police
station, the delay until 9:30 a.m. in discussing a formal arrest,
and the failure to place Gary under arrest until after his
confession" (Br. of App. at 26) . When the formal arrest occurred,
however, is not at issue. The issue is whether, at 6:50 am, Howell
had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and
that defendant committed it.4
Because defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate that the
undisputed

facts found by the trial court led to a clearly

erroneous ruling, the trial court's probable cause determination
should

be upheld.

Accordingly,

this

Court

need

not

reach

defendant's attenuation argument.
4

Similarly misplaced is defendant's focus on alternative
explanations for the blood found on his shoes, shirt, and pants
(Br. of App. at 25) .
An alternative explanation is usually
available in situations in which a crime has been committed and is
not dispositive of the question of whether the facts known to
Howell, along with their reasonable inferences, justified his
belief that defendant committed the crime.
12

POINT TWO
THE STATEMENTS DEFENDANT MADE AFTER HE INVOKED
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA WERE
ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE DEFENDANT INITIATED THE
CONVERSATION, HE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND HE MADE THE
STATEMENTS VOLUNTARILY.
The United States Supreme Court mandated in Miranda v. Arizona
that, prior to the custodial questioning of an individual by the
police, "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney. . . . "

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct.

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) .

The purpose of this warning is to

protect the individual's constitutional rights, ensured by the
fifth

and

fourteenth

incrimination.

amendments,

against

compelled

self-

In the same opinion, the Court outlined procedures

that must be followed once the warning is properly given.

For

example, " [i]f the accused indicates that he wishes to remain
silent, 'the interrogation must cease.'

If he requests counsel,

'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.'"
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68
L.Ed. 378 (1981) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, 86
S.Ct. at 1627).
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme
Court have addressed the conditions necessary to waive Miranda
rights that have been properly invoked.

Statements made after an

individual has invoked his right to counsel but before counsel is
made available to him are admissible only if three conditions are
13

met:
First, it must be the accused, not the law
enforcement officers, who initiates the
conversations in which the incriminating
statements are made. Second, the prosecution
must show, on the motion to suppress, a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel. Third, the accused's statements must
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to
have been voluntarily made.
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).

Accord Oregon v.

Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)
(plurality opinion); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct.
1880, 68 L.Ed. 378 (1981); State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295 (Utah
1984).

The totality of the circumstances must be examined in

determining whether a suspect has made a valid waiver of Miranda
rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 483, 191 S.Ct. at 1884
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d
1461 (1938). Notably, the waiver need not be express, but "may be
inferred from [defendant's] acknowledgement of his understanding of
his rights and his subsequent course of action."

State v.

Heaelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).
Applying this test to the instant facts, defendant must first
initiate

the

statements.

conversation

that

elicits

the

State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236.

incriminating

Defendant argues

that the incriminating conversation was simply an extension of
ongoing events, that continuing to detain defendant after he
requested counsel constituted an ongoing, indirect interrogation.
Because the interrogation was continuous, defendant could not
14

"initiate" the later conversation in which he incriminated himself
(Br. of App. at 13-14) .

Defendant implies that to "initiate" a

conversation within the meaning of Moore. a defendant first must be
released from police custody or booked into jail and then, at some
later time, independently reestablish contact with the police.
Such a position, in essence, creates a requirement that the
defendant be removed from the immediate presence of the police as
soon as the right to counsel is invoked. This proposition rests on
no discernible legal precedent.
Analytically,

defendant's

status

unrelated to his request for counsel.

in

police

custody

is

Plainly, defendant was in

custody before, during, and after his request for counsel. What is
relevant here is whether the incriminating statements made by
defendant after he invoked his right to counsel were the result of
any governmental interrogation or its functional equivalent.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he term "interrogation under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.
Rhode Island v. Innis. 466 U.S. 291, 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90,
64 L.Ed. 2nd 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

Whether a police

statement or comment is likely to evoke an incriminating response
must be resolved from the perspective of the defendant, but "in
light of the officers' knowledge of the suspects characteristics."
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Utah App. 1991)
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It is undisputed that as soon as defendant requested counsel,
the police interrogation about the fire and the homicide came to an
immediate end (R. 239, 284, 302, 305-06).

Detective Timmerman

explicitly

the

clarified

to

defendant

that

interview

was

terminating because he had requested counsel (R. 239, 262).
Between that time and the moment defendant stated that he
wanted to talk, no express interrogation and nothing that could
reasonably be construed as its functional equivalent occurred. At
breakfast in the public safety building cafeteria, Detective Alcock
and defendant conversed about mutual acquaintances in the taxi cab
business (R. 240-42, 275) .

The only conversation even remotely

relating to the events at Bryan Avenue concerned defendant's
purchase of aspirin for pain from his cut hand (R. 302, 306-07).
The breakfast conversation was not a continuation of interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda and its progeny; nor should Miranda
be so narrowly construed as to eliminate all manner of conversation
between an individual in custody and a police officer.
When the two men returned to the sixth floor after breakfast,
Detective Alcock left defendant in an interview room for a few
moments and then returned to the room, intending to tell defendant
that some replacement clothing had been found for him.

Alcock's

words, if indeed they were actually spoken, were plainly not
"interrogation" within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis; they
were not designed to elicit or likely to elicit an incriminating
response from defendant.

See State v. Singer. 815 P.2d at 1311

(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis. 466 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 168816

89).

Rather, their purpose was to get defendant's attention and

provide him with information.
Defendant's words to Alcock, reported either as "I want to
tell you what really happened last night.

I can't live with this

anymore," or "I need to talk to you," constituted the initiation of
conversation required by Moore (R. 244, 308, 723). Defendant's
words marked the first time since he had requested counsel that any
substantive reference to the events of the previous evening had
been made.

With no prompting by Detective Alcock, defendant's

words clearly communicated "a desire . . .

to open up a more

generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the
investigation."
The

second

Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2835.
condition necessary

for admissibility

of an

incriminating statement made after the right to counsel has been
invoked but prior to counsel being made available is that the
prosecution show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel.

State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236.

This determination

"depends 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.'"

Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2835.

Defendant's argument on this point is that, since defendant
had been up all night and was obviously tired, and since he had
been in the company of police officers from shortly after the fire
was discovered until he made his incriminating statement, he did
not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel (Br. of
App. at 14).
17

In this case, defendant knew full well what he was doing when
he waived

his

statement.

right

to

counsel

and made

his

incriminating

At the suppression hearing, he testified about the

content of the Miranda warning, explaining that it allowed him to
remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and
that he had the right to a lawyer, regardless of his ability to pay
(R. 301) . He knew that when he invoked his right to counsel, that
request caused all questioning about the events at Bryan Avenue to
immediately cease (R. 302, 305-06).

Despite his frustration and

exhaustion, he knew that when he told Alcock he wanted to talk
about what happened, he still had the right to an attorney (R.
309).

He reiterated this several times (R. 309-11).
Immediately prior to making his confession, defendant was once

again reminded of his Miranda rights.

The following interchange

with Detective Alcock occurred at the outset of the conversation in
which defendant spelled out the details of what he had done:
Q:
Now there's several things that I need
to advise you of again, before we proceed.
Number 1 [sic] is you know, we have advised
you of your rights as per Miranda.
A:

Right.

Q:
And at the outset, you agreed to talk
with us.
A:

Right.

Q:
Then we got down to the tail end there
where we asked if we could draw blood, at
which time you said you wished to talk to an
attorney. Now, what I want to make it clear
here [sic], is that you're still under
Miranda, you have requested an attorney, so we
have reached a point where you voluntarily. .

A:

By my choice.

Q:
Of your own free will and accord, if you
wish to make a statement, we'll listen to it,
ok. I want you to understand that you still
have that right to an attorney. If you wish
to, voluntarily, you are not being coerced.
A:

Yes, I do wish.

Can't live with myself.

(State's Exhibit #37 or addendum c) .

This conversation, while

explicitly designed to establish the voluntary element of the
confession, implicitly demonstrates defendant's understanding of
what he was about to do.

Even as he was about to confess,

defendant was aware that he had a right to an attorney and that he
need not proceed with any incriminating statement. His subsequent
conduct, then, weighs heavily in favor of waiver.

See State v.

Heaelman. 717 P.2d at 1349.
Finally,

to meet

the third condition

for

admissibility,

defendant's statement must be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence to have been voluntarily made.
at 236.

State v. Moore, 697 P.2d

The crux of defendant's argument on this point is that,

because defendant was exhausted and suffering from a serious cut on
his hand, and because he had been in police company for up to six
hours and his request for counsel had not been immediately met, his
confession was essentially coerced (Br. of App. at 14-15).
At the suppression hearing, defendant testified at length on
this point, stating that he knew he still had the right to an
attorney, but "At that point, I was -- I mean, I was tired,
exhausted, frustrated. • . • I felt like -- like -- I mean, I was
going to be stuck in this room until something was said" (R. 309) .
19

Later, he added, "As frustrated as I was — I

mean, I was sick of

sitting there" (R. 310).
The undisputed facts reflect that defendant invoked his right
to counsel at 9:14 am, that the questioning immediately ceased,
that Detective Alcock then accompanied defendant to the cafeteria
for 45-60 minutes and that, at 10:15 am, shortly upon returning to
an interview room, defendant expressed a desire to talk.

An hour

at most passed between the time defendant requested counsel and the
time he decided to confess. The frustration expressed by defendant
at the suppression hearing might well reflect his feelings at the
time, but the source of those feelings cannot reasonably be
attributed to "some physical or psychological force or manipulation
that is designed to induce the accused to talk when he would not
otherwise have done so." State v. Moore. 697 P.2d at 237 (emphasis
added).

There is simply no record evidence to suggest any

intentional conduct on the part of the police either to deny
defendant his right to counsel or to unnecessarily detain him.
Indeed, anyone who is detained by the police may well
experience frustration, anxiety, or other intense psychological
distress:
'Any interview of one suspected of a crime by
a police officer will have coercive aspects to
it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement
system which may ultimately cause the suspect
to be charged with a crime.'
State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355, 357 (1980) (quoting Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)).
Nonetheless, "a confession is not involuntary because an accused
20

experiences some anxiety because of his arrest and incarceration."
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. Such, indeed, was the case here.
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's findings that
defendant's statements "were voluntary and not coerced" (R. 287).
Because the trial court's determination that defendant had
waived his Miranda rights was not "clearly in error" and because
defendant has failed to show that the court abused its discretion,
the determination should be upheld.

See State v. Hecrelman. 717

P.2d at 1349 (citing State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980)) .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for murder and aggravated arson.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
24th, 1992 f

At about 4:00 a.m. on April

a fire occurred at 434 Bryan Avenue.

Defendant, a resident of said address, was present,
and was discovered by the fire personnel as well as
the police officers.

And around 4:30 a.m. on that

date, the police rendered first aid to the Defendant,
Gary D. Hilfiker.
Following the rendition of first aid,
the Defendant was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for
treatment of a badly or severely lacerated

right

hand •
When the medical treatment at Holy Cross
was completed

and Officer Whitaker started to return

the Defendant back to his home at 434 Bryan Avenue,
Officer Singer

(sic) contacted Whitaker by phone and

directed him to transport the Defendant to the Public
Safety Building.

That occurred some time around

a.m. on April the 24th, 1992.

6:00

And the Defendant and

Officer Whitaker arrived at the Public Safety Building
sometime shortly after 6:00 a.m., 6:20 a.m., on that
morning.
When Officer Whitaker indicated

they

were going to the Public Safety Building, the
Defendant was initially excited, and indicated that
2

nnno£fi

1

they had found the body and that they thought he did

2

it.

3

Defendant under arrest, asked Defendant to answer some

Officer Whitaker, himself, didn f t consider

41 questions and the Defendant said he was willing to
5

talk with someone.

61

When they arrived at the Public Safety

71 Building, Officer Whitaker subsequently turned the
81 Defendant over to Officer Howell sometime after
91

6:00

a.m.

10

Detective Howell, who was with the

111 Homicide Unit, was the assigned detective in charge of
121 the -- first of the fire, and then of the homicide.
131

Around 6:30 a.m., Officer Howell took

141 Defendant into an interview room there in the Arson
151 Division, and interviewed the Defendant for
161 approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
17

MR. BOWN:

I believe that was the

181 Robbery Division.
19

THE COURT:

201 stand corrected.
211

The Robbery Division, I

Thank you.

The subject matter of that interview

22

generally related to the searching of the house and

23

the vehicles and the property located at 434 Bryan

241 Avenue.
25

At that point, the officers had found
3
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the body of Marsha Haverty.

They had found a knife

with blood on it out in the yard.
blood on three cars.

They had found

They had found an accelerant

burn pattern in the building.

They had observed a

jacket inside of the cab with blood on it: a white
jacket behind the house with blood on it.

And the

jackets appeared to have a common logo on them.
They had found that there was no forced
entry into the house.

They had found that the

Defendant had blood on his shoes, pants and shirt.
They had questioned Defendant, who they
knew to be a resident at that address, briefly about
how the fire had started.

And during that interview,

there was not an adequate explanation of his
whereabouts for the prior two hours.
Officer Howell asked Defendant for
permission to search the home and the vehicle, and
Defendant gave his consent for the search.

To that

point, there had had been no Miranda Warning, and
nothing incriminatory had been said.
Officer Howell then went about preparing
the consent document.
At that point. Defendant was moved to an
interview room in the Homicide Division there on the
sixth floor of the Public Safety Building.
4
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Defendant was given the Miranda Warning
as the interview started
6:50

in the Homicide Section about

a.m.
Officer Howell advised Defendant he

didn't want to let him go until he got more
information.

He advised Defendant he was detaining

him.
Officer Howell continued the
interrogation until about 7:15 a.m., even though
Defendant had indicated he was tired and wanted to get
some sleep.
No incriminatory statements had been
made.
Defendant had not been placed under
formal arrest.
Sometime near that time, Officer Howell
turned the Defendant over to Officer Whitaker
who was in the interrogation room.

(sic),

Officer Howell

gave instructions to Officer Alcock to continue the
interrogation.

Officer Alcock continued

the

interrogation.
At about 9:00 a.m., the first side of
the tape was full, the tape was turned over and
Officer Alcock reminded the Defendant again of his
Miranda Rights.

The interview continued until around
5
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y:14

a.m.

A request was made to draw blood from
the Defendant.

At that time, Defendant said:

"I want

a lawyer now,"
A few more clarifying questions were
asked by Officer Alcock, he terminated the
interrogation and asked no more questions about either
the fire or the homicide.
Defendant made a comment to Alcock that
he was hungry, so he and the Defendant went to
breakfast in the Public Safety Building Cafeteria
downstairs.
No questions were asked about the fire
or the homicide.
After breakfast, the Defendant and
Alcock returned to the interview room.
During the second interview, there had
been discussions about taking Defendant's clothing
because of the bloodstains, thereon, and there had
been discussions about getting a change of clothes.
Evidence had called about that time, and advised that
they had located a change of clothing for the
Defendant so that Defendant's clothing could be
examined •
Officer Alcock was briefly out of the
6
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interrogation room, he returned and advised the
Defendant that the clothing were available and that
arrangements could be made to change out of the soiled
clothing.
At that point, the Defendant

indicated

to Officer Alcock that he wanted to tell him
something•
Alcock, at that point, left the room to
secure a tape recorder*

He returned with a tape

recorder, and reminded the Defendant that the officers
had advised him of his rights, which the Defendant
acknowledged•
Officer Alcock then reminded Defendant
that he still had the right to an attorney.
Defendant, following that admonition,
indicated that it was his wish to go ahead.
Thereafter, the Defendant made his
confession.
The Defendant, following the medical
treatment, went to the Public Safety Building
willingly and voluntarily.

Well before he gave any

incriminatory information, he was advised of -- given
the Miranda Warnings.
He voluntarily gave his consent to the
search of his premises and vehicles.

7

000285

He was again reminded of his rights at
the end of the first tape.
When Officer Zimmerman

(sic) sought to

draw a blood sample and Defendant asked for a lawyer,
the interrogation was stopped.
Officer Alcock, thereafter, took
Defendant to breakfast.

Nothing was discussed

relating to the homicide or the arson during
breakfast; although, there was a brief discussion
about Defendant's injured hand, and the aspirins were
secured for the hand.
When they returned to the interrogation
room and Officer Alcock advised the Defendant that the
clothing had been secured and were ready, the
Defendant, without any provocation from Officer
Alcock, advised the Defendant

(sic) that he wanted to

tell him something.
At that point, Officer Alcock again
reminded him of his Miranda Rights, which the
Defendant acknowledged he understood.
Officer Alcock, again, reminded him of
his right to an attorney.

And notwithstanding

the

second admonition, Defendant advised Officer Alcock
that he wished to continue.
The Court finds and concludes the
8
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ll statements, thereafter, were voluntary and not
2

coerced.

31

At the time the Defendant was asked to

41 consent to the search of his home and vehicles, the
51 officers had probable cause to secure a search
6

warrant.

7

for the searches.

81
9

Defendant voluntarily gave his permission

Accordingly, the Court concludes, after
considering the totality of the circumstances, that

10

Defendant's motion to suppress the confession taken at

11

the Public Safety Building should be denied, and that

12

the seizure of the Defendant was done with probable

13

cause and was not illegal*

141

Both motions to suppress are denied.

151

MR. BOWN:

16

Your Honor, in anticipation

of the future, I note some of these cases indicate

171 that they will review probable cause themselves, and
18

then they will send it back for an attenuation

19

hearing.

Would the Court consider making

findings

201 about attenuation if, in fact, there was no probable
21! cause so that that hearing wouldn't have to occur?
22

THE COURT:

Well, I don't recall that I

231 have the part of the transcript that identified -- you
24

only gave me one page.

I don't know the specific time

25

in which the tape was put on on the last

interview.

9
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1| Does it have the time?
21

MR. BOWN:

I believe Officer Alcock

31 indicated that by his watch -- although it was not on
4

the tape, he said 12:15 is when it started.

5

MS. JOHNSON:

6|

MR. BOWN:

71

THE COURT:

10:15.

Excuse me, 10:15.
And the Court would

8

specifically find that the request for a lawyer was

9

9:14, 9:15.

And that during that intervening period

10

of time, they went down to the cafeteria on the first

11

floor of the Public Safety Building and obtained

12

breakfast.

13

the sixth floor of the Homicide Division, which was in

14

the range of 10:15, that there was any conversation at

And it wasn't until they arrived back at

151 all that related to anything pertaining to the case,
16

other than the brief conversation in the cafeteria

17

about the injured hand.

18

And when they arrived back, Officer

191 Alcock was out of the room for a few minutes, came
20

back and he indicated to the Defendant that the

211 clothes were available and ready.

And it was at that

221 point that the Defendant said he had something he
231 wanted to tell him.
241

The officer went and got a tape recorder

251 at that point, returned to the room and reminded the

I

10
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1

Defendant of the earlier Miranda Warnings he had

21 received, one; and, two, he said he still had a right
31 to an attorney,
41
5

And the Court would conclude that that's
sufficient attenuation? again, reminded him of those

61 rights, and gave him the opportunity, if he wanted an
7

attorney, and the Defendant replied that he wanted to

81 go forward.
9

MR. BOWN:

10
11

THE COURT:

A motion was filed October

20th on motion for discovery.

12
13

Thank you.

Have you received that?

Have you

disposed of that?

14

MR. BOWN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BOWN:

I received a couple of them.
I've only been handed one.
There was the independent

17

testing of the two vials of blood taken from

18

Mr. Hilfiker.

19

provided.

201
21

And I understand that that has been

MS. JOHNSON:

That's correct. Judge, we

do have that*

221

MR. BOWN:

And the only reason I —

and

231 that was done by Mr. Ernie Jones when I was out of the
241 office*
25

I only wanted that to be heard so that you

would understand that this was under the expert -- the
11
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ADDENDUM B

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
March 24, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Jan Graham
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
BUILDING MAIL

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gary D. Hilfiker,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 930037
921900991

Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

\
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ADDENDUM C

>-*^^' v THi^

CASE:

#92-40741

SUBJECT:

GARY HILFIKER

Q:

Let's get this down on tape Ok Gary. Now there's several
things that I need to advise you of again, before we
proceed. Number 1 is you know, we have advised you of your
rights*T>er Miranda.
A
Right.

Q

And at the outset, you agreed to talk tsr us.
Right.
Then we got down to the tail end there where we asked if we
could draw blood, at which time you said you wished to talk
to an attorney. Now, what I want to make it clear here, is
that you're still under Miranda, you have requested an
attorney,
so
we
have
reached
a
point
where
you
voluntarily

A:

By my choice.

Q:

Of your own free will and of u„iirrre, if you wish to make a
statement, we'll listen to it, Ok.
I want you to
understand that you still have that right to an attorney.
If you wish to, voluntarily, you are not being coerced.

A:

Yes I do wish.

Q:

Ok.
Ok, Gary, let's start from the beginning.
I guess
a
I'm just going to basically let you run with it and
tell me what there is to be told. If there are additional
questions, I'll come back, Ok, and ask.
Alright.
Now
you'll feel better when it's all said and done and I think
you realize that.
Ok, go ahead.
Why don't you start
with
tdss^ you feel comfortable with starting at.

A:

I don't feel comfortable with it at all. I lost my head, I
was stoned, I could sit here and lie to you all day long,
^,^,,-rin fact I can pass one of those test,
because°*J&se&3l.MpeotM&r
What happened was, I went home and I had some Coke that was
still with me, and she and I got stoned about a week before
and she said, she didn't want to get stoned^ ^Py&%&t/r/v£^7~
alright. I went home and I went into the house^ana 1 xoTa ~
her, fine, then I will split *Alc^e^^B/^ie
didn't want me to
leave, she was getting realyjj/j*e*y^ serious.
Myself, I
didn't get too serious.^ ^She k m d a held on to me. I pushed
her away and we were in thexdining room, which is between
the front room and the a.. \ . between the front of the
house, where she was found and\ the back of the house. I

~<to£-&tC

*"*"/&*

